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Many developing countries possess comparative advantage both in natural resources and in 
labor-intensive industries, and experience both industrial pollution and natural resource 
degradation. We present a model that incorporates these stylized facts together with key 
spatial features and property rights failures typical of developing economies. We explore 
consequences of anticipated domestic and global trade policy and world price changes.  
Similar exogenous or policy shocks are seen to have contrasting effects, depending on initial 
economic structure, trade orientation and policy regime.  Further, when there is more than 
one sectoral source of environmental damage, a policy or price change may have unexpected 
environmental and welfare results.  Nevertheless, in many empirically important cases, 
reducing protection for capital intensive manufactures is likely to improve both income and 
environmental quality, a point that we illustrate by reference to some Asian case studies.  
These results stand in contrast to those obtained in much of the current analytical literature. 
 
 
Key Words: Trade, environment, pollution, deforestation, developing countries.  
 
 
JEL:  F18, O24, Q28 
 1  Introduction 
Developing countries increasingly face problems of air and water pollution arising from 
industrial emissions, in addition to degradation of natural resources such as forest, land and 
water.  Though they may occur in different sectors, different types of environmental degradation 
are not independent: in addition to bio-physical relationships, they are also linked by sectoral 
interdependencies operating through factor and commodity markets. This means that strategies 
for alleviating environmental degradation must take account of these linkages.  
 This need is of particular importance in analyses of the relationship between trade and the 
environment.  By the 1990s, the benefits of liberalized trade for economic development had won 
widespread acceptance, motivating trade policy reforms in most developing countries.  More 
recently, however, concerns about environmental consequences of freer trade have reignited the 
trade liberalization debate.  The value of a better understanding of trade-environment links in the 
specific context of developing economies is now very high.  Sectoral interdependencies demand 
that this relationship be approached from a general equilibrium perspective. 
 Although general equilibrium theoretical approaches to trade-environment questions are 
well established, the current literature in this area has serious limitations where developing 
economies are concerned. On environmental issues, many analyses are highly aggregative, 
combining widely different types of environmental damage into a single variable. Though this 
approach can help elucidate basic principles, it is much less useful as a guide to normative 
analysis and policy formulation.  Other analyses choose to deal only with a single concern, such 
as air pollution or deforestation.  Even in their excellent review of key literature and 
consolidation of main analytical results, Copeland and Taylor (2003) deliberately restrict the 
scope of their analysis to industrial pollution, omitting analysis of natural resource use and 
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depletion.1 While the focus on industrial pollutants may arguably be adequate for some 
industrialized economies, it is inadequate for developing countries, where natural resource 
degradation shares top billing or even outranks industrial pollution as a leading environmental 
problem (Asian Development Bank 1997; Jha and Whalley 1999).  Nowhere is this more true 
than in tropical Asia, where natural resource stocks are under severe threat, with deforestation 
rates the highest of any world region (Table 1).   
For the past three decades, the fundamental rationale for trade policy liberalization in 
developing countries has been the recognition of multiple sources of comparative advantage, 
emphasizing their potential for export success not only in natural resource products, but also in 
labor-intensive manufactures (Little et al 1970; Bhagwati 1978; Papageorgiou et al 1991; Collier 
and Gunning 1994).  Though this literature is silent on the environmental consequences of trade, 
any policy-relevant analysis of trade-environment questions cannot afford to ignore its central 
insight on comparative advantage, highlighting the critical importance of labor intensive exports 
for economic growth. 
The seminal formalization of the links between manufacturing sector trade reforms and 
natural resource degradation in a developing country setting is Deacon (1995).  He analyzes the 
impact of tariff reform on deforestation in a Ricardian model with two traded goods (a protected, 
import competing manufactured good and an exportable agricultural good) and one 
intersectorally mobile factor, labor. Labor is also used to convert open-access forest into 
agricultural land.  Trade liberalization shrinks the manufacturing sector, which releases labor. 
This reduces the cost of forest conversion for agriculture, thereby unambiguously increasing 
deforestation. This illustrates the proposition that an institutional failure, a particular type of 
distortion of which open access to a natural resource is one example, will lead to socially 
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excessive pollution (or resource degradation) when trade frictions are reduced, if the country has 
comparative advantage in the polluting sector (Brander and Taylor 1997).  At the same time, 
however, this result pits environmental concerns against the conventional gains from trade 
liberalization; if preservation of the natural environment has positive value, then the Deacon 
result indicates a welfare tradeoff.  
This tradeoff, however, is contingent on a model structure that precludes by assumption 
the more realistic case in which a developing country also has comparative advantage in some 
labor-intensive manufacturing industry.  In addition, the model assumes that there is no welfare- 
reducing industrial pollution.  In fact, empirical evidence indicates that capital-intensive heavy 
industry—the sector typically protected—is much more pollution-intensive than are labor-
intensive industries (Table 2 illustrates this point).  As we will show in this paper, the implication 
of an unambiguously negative relationship between trade liberalization and environmental 
quality that emerges from the Deacon model, as with the Brander and Taylor result on reducing 
trade frictions, does not hold robustly in models that are consistent with the key stylized facts of 
developing countries.  
In the following section we set out a model which retains the key institutional assumption 
of weak property rights in natural resources, but in which there is scope for more diversified 
production structures both in manufacturing and in natural resources sectors.  We show that 
while there may in principle be a tradeoff between industrial pollution and natural resource 
degradation, in the most empirically relevant cases lowering manufacturing sector protection is 
likely to reduce both industrial pollution and natural resource degradation.  We also explore 
likely implications for developing countries of some other important trade-related shocks and 
policy reforms, including those anticipated in the current Doha Round negotiations.  Our results 
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highlight the sensitivity of outcomes to differences in economic structure and the need for 
caution when generalizing about the environmental effects of trade reforms and price shocks; 
because relevant aspects of economic structure vary even among apparently similar developing 
countries, one size does not fit all.   
2  Model structure and assumptions 
As indicated, our model attempts to capture key stylized features of small developing economies, 
particularly those in tropical Asia, though many of its features are common to many other 
developing countries.2  In particular, we model a small open economy with comparative 
advantage in two types of good, an agricultural commodity and labor-intensive manufacturing.  
The model comprises two sub-economies, manufacturing and agriculture.  We make the 
following initial assumptions:   
1. Manufacturing (M) is a mini-Heckscher-Ohlin economy with mobile labor and capital, 
producing an import-competing, tariff-protected good H, and an exportable X.  X has a 
relatively high labor-to-capital ratio (). Based on empirical evidence on the relative 
pollution intensity of industries in developing countries, we specify that the low  sector 
is pollution-intensive (‘dirty’), while the other sector is ‘clean’. Industrial emissions, J, 
are produced in constant proportion to the output of H, i.e. J = βyH, β > 0.  The external 
costs of pollution are not internalized by dirty sector firms. 
2. Agriculture (A) is a mini-Ricardo-Viner-Jones economy, in which the sectors are distinct 
sub-regions, ‘upland’ (U) and ‘lowland’ (F) with region-specific endowments of land, T 
in upland and N in lowland.  T and N differ due to variation in elevation, soil type, access 
to irrigation and other agro-climatic factors.  Labor is mobile between the two sectors.  
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Initially we assume that the lowland region produces import-competing ‘food’, whereas 
the upland produces plantation crops for export, as is typical in many tropical countries.3 
This regional division reflects the important stylized fact that in much of the tropics, rice 
and other staple foods are grown primarily in river deltas and other low-lying, often 
irrigated areas, while ‘uplands’ or ‘dry lands’ are often planted to a mix of crops that may 
include food alongside perennial crops such as tea, rubber, cacao and oil palm. 
Conversion of ‘uplands’ to ‘lowlands’ is thus very costly, and differences in key agro-
climatic factors result in continuing productivity differences that justify treating these as 
essentially two different land types. The outer boundary of upland cultivation in the 
tropics is usually the forest frontier; the conversion of forest land to agriculture is 
essentially an upland phenomenon. 4  
3. Forest is an open-access resource that yields T through deforestation.  To focus on the 
environmental benefits of forest we assume it to produce only non-marketed outputs.5  T 
is produced and maintained using labor LT according to T = LT/α, where α  > 0 is the unit 
labor requirement.  Thus the labor available for upland agricultural production is LU – αT.   
We also assume that labor (L) is freely mobile among all activities and sectors; there are 
constant returns to scale, complete markets (except for environmental goods) and perfect 
competition in goods and factor markets.  Consumers derive utility from consumption of 
marketed goods and environmental goods (standing forest and clean air).  Environmental 
phenomena affect the economy only through consumer utility rather than through intersectoral 
effects on production costs, and we ignore trans-boundary pollution issues.6  Finally, to focus on 
the environmental stories we assume that tariff and tax revenues are redistributed to consumers 
in lump-sum fashion. We recognize that trade liberalization does have important dynamic growth 
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effects, and thereby contributes to what Antweiler et al. (2001) have termed the ‘scale effect’ (a 
bigger economy pollutes more, other things equal).  However, our focus is on changes in the 
structure of production and factor demand, or the ‘composition effect’ of trade-related changes 
derived via comparative static analyses.7 
The foregoing assumptions mean that we have an economy with three distortions: a tariff 
in the import-competing manufacturing sector, an absence of property rights in forests, and a 
missing market for pollution produced by firms in manufacturing.  In principle, first-best policies 
would imply moving to free trade while imposing Pigovian taxes on polluting firms, and 
enacting appropriate reforms to ensure that forest-related consumption externalities are fully 
internalized.  But analytical issues arise precisely because in practice, such first best policies are 
very difficult to implement.  Hence it is appropriate to explore the effects of specific policy 
reforms in the continuing presence of one or more of these distortions. 
Turning to the model, full employment of labor implies L = LU + LF + LM.  Prices for 
each good are denoted by pU and pF for upland and lowland agriculture respectively, and pH and 
pX (= 1 by assumption) respectively for the import-competing (dirty) and exportable (clean) 
manufactures.  We assume these prices to be set in world markets and thus to be exogenous to 
the economy.  The quantities of lowland land and manufacturing capital (K) are assumed 
exogenously fixed, but there is an endogenous supply of upland land through deforestation.  
Using this notation and assuming profit-maximizing producers, we define maximum revenue 
functions for each sector or region:  
Lowland (food):  Q(LF, N, pF) 
Upland:  R(LU – αT, T, pU) 
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Manufacturing:  S(L – LF – LU, K, pH). 
These functions reflect profit maximization subject to endowment constraints and are non-
decreasing and homogeneous of degree 1 in prices and endowments. Their sum is equal to total 
value added, I: 
 I = Q(LF, N, pF) + R(LU – αT, T, pU) + S(L – LF – LU, K, pH)   (1) 
We capture consumer preferences and behavior with a conditional minimum expenditure 
function, in which the quantity of industrial emissions, J, and the area of standing forest cleared 
for agriculture, T, are exogenous to the consumer.  Letting p stand for the vector (pF, pU, pH, 1):  
  E = E(p, J, T, υ)                 (2) 
This embodies all the information on the preferences of a utility-maximizing representative 
consumer with utility function υ(F, U, H, X; J, T), with υj > 0 for all j ∈ (F, U, H, X), υJ ≤ 0, υT ≤ 
0.  We follow existing trade models in assuming utility to be separable between marketed goods 
and environmental goods.   
 Let subscripts on Q, R, S, and E indicate derivatives of these functions with respect to 
subscripted variables, for example RT = ∂R/∂T.  To reduce notational clutter we write derivatives 
with respect to sectoral prices using sectoral symbols, for example, EM = ∂E/∂pH, EHF = 
∂2E/∂pH∂pF, and so on.  By the properties of the revenue and expenditure functions and the 
envelope theorem, RU is the supply of upland output, QN is the shadow value of lowland, EH is 
domestic demand for import-competing manufactures, ET is the negative of willingness to pay 
for standing forest, Eυ is the reciprocal of the marginal utility of income, and so on. Finally, 
recall that the initial domestic price of H is increased by a tariff; this is given by 
 
t
H
= p
H
! p 
H , 
where pH is the world price in domestic currency terms.  
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 Given return of tax revenues to consumers in lump-sum form, the aggregate budget 
constraint of this economy is: 
  E = I + tH(EH – SH)               (3) 
There is full employment in equilibrium, so the usual marginal productivity condition for labor 
requires that the following conditions hold:  
  QL(LF, N, pF)  = RL(LU – αT, T, pU)      (4) 
  RL(LU – αT, T, pU) = SL(L – LF – LU, K, pH)     (5) 
  RT(LU – αT, T, pU) – αRL(LU – αT, T, pU) = 0     (6) 
Conditions (4) and (5) state that in equilibrium, the marginal product of labor is equal in value 
terms across all sectors.  Condition (6) ensures that within the upland sector, labor used in land 
clearing and in production are of equal value at the margin.  It is thus a property of the model 
that since labor is the only input to land clearing, any shock that raises labor productivity in 
upland production also generates pressures for deforestation.8  The solution to equations (3) to 
(6) yields equilibrium values of real income, LF, LU, and T, each as a function of (p, tH, L, N, K).  
From these we can calculate changes in LM as well as sectoral and regional outputs, the wage, 
and industrial emissions.  So long as production of land from forest is a linear function of labor 
alone, however, we can obtain all the comparative static results of interest by solving (5) and (6) 
for LF and LU.  The solution will then yield LM from the labor constraint, and T can be found 
directly from LU.  For price changes, comparative static results are obtained by totally 
differentiating (4) and (5), holding all factor endowments except land constant, to yield: 
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in which |Δ|, the determinant of the coefficient matrix, is quickly established as 
 
Q
LL
R
LL
+ S
LL( ) + RLLSLL > 0 .  Comparative static results are obtained using Cramer’s rule.   
3.  Environmental and welfare effects of trade policy reforms 
In this section we use the model first to see the effects of domestic trade policy reforms.  WTO 
compliance by developing countries typically requires reduced manufacturing sector protection, 
so we stylize this reform as a manufacturing tariff reduction (the agricultural tariff case will be 
explored later in the paper).  Subsequently, we examine potential changes in international prices 
reflecting the relaxation of rich-country cereal export subsidies as envisaged under the Doha 
Round, then a counterpart shock affecting world demand for tropical industrial crops, which are 
mainly grown in the areas we have described as ‘upland’.  
Effects of domestic tariff reform 
In this model, a price shock in one sector alters economy-wide resource allocations, and so 
affects the production of each type of environmental damage, with economy-wide labor mobility, 
and capital mobility within manufacturing, serving as adjustment mechanisms.  Consider first a 
tariff reform.  A ceteris paribus tariff reduction in the capital-intensive manufacturing sector 
raises the return to labor and causes out-migration of workers from agriculture.  Solving from 
(7), using the definition of tH and setting dtH < 0 gives:  
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10 
 
 
dL
U
=
1
!
QLLSLHdt
H
< 0        (9) 
By substitution into the full employment constraint (with dL = 0) we also find:  
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M
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SLH QLL + RLL( )dt
H
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Tariff reduction, by raising labor productivity in manufacturing relative to that (measured at 
initial wages) in other sectors, results in labor migration to manufacturing from agriculture.  This 
leads to the following proposition concerning environmental damages: 
 
Proposition 1 (Tariff reform):  Reducing the tariff on the polluting manufacturing sector reduces 
deforestation and reduces industrial pollution when the protected manufacturing sector is 
relatively pollution-intensive, and increases overall welfare.    
 
Because H is capital-intensive, reducing its relative price causes X to expand, driving up wages.  
The drop in H output results in lower emissions, i.e. dJ < 0.  Labor moves out of agricultural 
sectors, and since dT/dLU = α > 0, deforestation declines.  It is thus a feature of the model that 
even with comparative advantage in plantation crops and open access to forested land for 
conversion into plantation crop land, the plantation sector contracts when the tariff on an import-
competing sector is reduced.  
The real income effect of a small change in the tariff is found by totally differentiating 
(3), using (2) and (1) and setting changes in the exogenous prices and quantities equal to zero.  
Defining net imports ZH = (EH – SH), and using (4) – (6) to eliminate some terms, we obtain: 
  
 
!d" + E
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M               (11) 
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where γ = Eυ – tHEHυ > 0 and dLM = –(dLF + dLU).  The first term on the left hand side provides 
the usual measure of change in the real consumer income; the second and third terms capture the 
utility effects of changes in environmental variables.  If we ignore these for a moment by setting 
EJ = ET = 0, then (11) provides a measure of real income change due to the tariff change.  The 
first term on the right hand side conveys the familiar deadweight loss of protection due to 
reallocation of resources within the manufacturing sector.  Since ZHH = (EHH – SHH) < 0, this term 
is positive for dtH < 0.  The second term captures an additional efficiency change due to the 
reallocation of labor between manufacturing and agriculture.  For a tariff reduction this signed 
term is also positive.  In sum, real income must increase when trade is liberalized.  Finally, we 
know that both dT < 0 and dJ < 0 for a tariff reduction, so if EJ ≤ 0 and ET ≤ 0, a broad measure 
of consumer welfare, consisting of the sum of all three terms on the left hand side of (11), is 
unambiguously increased by trade reform.9   
Effects of global market shocks 
The Doha round of world trade talks includes proposals for the major industrialized food 
exporters to reduce subsidies paid to their own farmers.  These measures, if implemented, would 
raise world prices of most agricultural products—especially cereal grains.  Wheat and feedgrain 
prices are predicted to rise by about 25%; rice and corn by 8-12%, and oilseeds by 8% 
(Dimaranan et al. 2002).  Global trade reforms could thus impose large terms of trade shocks on 
food-trading developing economies.  This motivates our second experiment, in which we 
examine the effects of a rise in global grain prices.   
By the same method as in the tariff change analysis, the labor market effects of an 
increase in the price of food, the lowland agricultural product (dpF > 0) are: 
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The food price rise causes labor to migrate out of uplands and manufacturing.  In our 
model, lowland agriculture is a ‘clean’ industry producing import-competing goods.  A first 
reaction would be to predict a real income loss offset by gains from reduced environmental 
damage.  The story, however, is not so neat.  
 
Proposition 2 (food price rise): A rise in the world price of import-competing food crops, with 
labor mobile across all sectors and capital mobile within manufacturing, reduces real income 
and deforestation but increases industrial pollution.  Welfare gains are theoretically ambiguous. 
 
The labor market response shown in (12) to (14) is clear.  It can readily be deduced that the price 
shock results in a contraction of upland production, so dT < 0.  In manufacturing, however, less 
labor means lower output in the clean sector and thus, with a fixed capital stock, more in the 
dirty sector, so dJ > 0.  In this model the projected grain price increases from the Doha Round 
will have positive net environmental effects only if the benefits of lower upland production and 
reduced deforestation exceed the costs of increased pollution from expansion of ‘dirty’ capital 
intensive manufactures.   
The real income effect of the rise in pF is given by:  
  γdυ + EJdJ + ETdT = –ZF dpF + tH(EHFdpF – SHLdLM)               (15) 
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For tH taking small values, a rise in pF has a direct real income effect in which consumer losses 
are proportional to food imports.  This first-order effect is modified by two second-order effects 
capturing, respectively, higher tariff revenues due to substitution in consumption between F and 
H, and in manufacturing, an increase in tariff-related losses due to the expansion of H and 
contraction of X.  The first of these offsets part of the first-order real income loss while the 
second causes additional losses.  Real income net of environmental effects thus declines while 
industrial pollution increases. Hence overall welfare, inclusive of environmental changes, can 
increase only if the gains from reduced deforestation outweigh combined losses in real income 
and higher industrial pollution.  Empirically, a gain is possible only if EJdJ and the effects of 
food price rises are very small, while utility gains from reduced deforestation are very large.   
The second global price shock experiment concerns exportable agricultural products, 
which we assume (for now) to be grown in uplands only.  Global demand for tropical plantation 
commodities such as rubber, oil palm and timber is expanding rapidly, in large part because of 
the continuing rapid growth of large developing economies such as China and India. What will 
be the net environmental and welfare effects a global boom in upland crop prices?   
For an increase in the upland commodity price (dpU > 0) we obtain labor market 
responses as:   
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These results provide an indication of the likely direction of output changes, and motivate 
proposition 3.  
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Proposition 3 (Plantation crop price rise):  An increase in the price of plantation crops grown in 
uplands, with labor mobile across all sectors and capital mobile within manufacturing, increases 
real income but also increases both forms of environmental damage.  Welfare gains are more 
likely the lower the value attached to environmental damages.   
 
Raising the upland price produces a positive real income effect through the terms of trade, but 
unambiguously increases deforestation as upland agriculture expands, through in-migration of 
labor.  But this is only the direct environmental impact.  Less obviously, intersectoral migration 
also contributes to an increase in industrial pollution.  At constant relative prices of 
manufactures, reducing the labor endowment of manufacturing as a whole causes X to contract, 
drawing capital and labor into H; thus, the dirty sector expands and the clean sector contracts.  
To find welfare effects, take the total differential of (3) with respect to pU, holding the 
tariff, factor endowments and other product prices constant: 
  γdυ + EJdJ + ETdT = –ZUdpU + tH(EHUdpU – SHLdLM)              (19) 
The symmetry with the food price case is clear.  For an exportable, domestic excess demand ZU < 
0, so the first expression on the r.h.s is a positive direct terms of trade effect which raises real 
income.  Indirectly, the price change causes both expenditure and M sector resources to switch 
toward H.  As before, these second-order effects have opposed signs, so their net effect must be 
small in relation to the first-order impact through ZU.  The environmental losses are clear: dT is 
positive (i.e. deforestation increases), reflecting the higher value of open-access upland, and the 
transfer of M sector resources into H makes manufacturing more emissions-intensive, i.e. dJ > 0.  
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Welfare will rise only if environmental losses, weighted by their utility valuations, are smaller 
than the real income gain.   
 This case if of particular interest to resource-abundant developing economies.  Higher 
global demand for industrial plantation crops such as oil palm and rubber produce income gains 
for major exporters, such as Indonesia, but they come at a substantial environmental cost in 
terms of the deforestation.10   
No additional calculations are needed in order to see that the joint effects of global price 
shocks affecting both categories of agricultural product will be ambiguous: real income may rise 
or fall, and pressures on forests may increase or decline.  The only definite outcome is that as 
agricultural prices rise, industrial pollution will also rise as withdrawal of labor from 
manufacturing, with a fixed capital stock, causes the labor-intensive industry to contract and the 
capital-intensive industry to expand.  Deforestation will rise or fall, depending on the extent to 
which manufacturing releases labor and on the relative magnitudes of the labor demand effects 
from lowland and upland agricultural price changes.  In a nutshell, country-specific 
environmental consequences of global agricultural trade policies depend on initial economic 
structure.  
Structural effects: a geometric illustration 
The intuition underlying the above analyses can be appreciated with a geometric model.  In 
Figure 1 the central panel (b) shows the economy-wide labor market.  The width of the panel 
denotes the economy’s total labor endowment; employment in agriculture is measured to the 
right from 0A, and that in manufacturing to the left from 0M.  Labor demand curves for the M and 
A sub-economies are constructed by horizontal addition of those for the respective sectors, as 
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shown.  In the initial equilibrium, the economy-wide wage (w) is given by the intersection of LA 
and LM.  
The right-hand panel (c) shows unit cost (i.e. zero profit) curves for each manufacturing 
sector in factor price space (Mussa 1979).  Note that the wage is set economy-wide, rather than 
purely within the manufacturing sector.  Product prices and the wage determine the set of 
feasible manufacturing industries and the location of their unit cost curves.  The (negative of the) 
aggregate capital-labor ratio in manufacturing is shown by the line ′; an increase in the ratio 
increases the slope of this line, and a ratio higher than the slope of a line tangent to cH at the 
intersection of the unit cost curves (point G) implies specialization in capital-intensive 
production.11  For given wage and prices, with both goods being produced, we can read off the 
equilibrium return to M sector capital, rM, on the horizontal axis.   
 In the left-hand panel (a) we show the analogous curves for the two agricultural sectors.  
The horizontal axis shows unit returns to land in each agricultural region, rU and rF.  These are 
not required to be equal, though for convenience we have chosen units of land so as to equate 
them in the initial equilibrium.  
 Weak property rights in uplands means that profit-maximizing producers use this 
resource up to the point at which its average product is equal to average cost (Gordon 1954).  We 
can capture this by interpreting the curve LA in panel (b) as the horizontal sum of labor demands 
in lowland and upland agriculture, noting that under open access to forests, upland labor demand 
exceeds the quantity that would be observed if property rights were enforced.  In the initial 
equilibrium, open access means that there is overuse of labor in upland; were property rights 
enforced, the total labor demand curve in agriculture would lie to the left of LA.  
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 In manufacturing, because we assume that producers in the dirty industry are not 
penalized for emissions, free disposal of air and water pollutants leaves producers on their 
(private) marginal product curves, while producing a negative social externality.  
To illustrate the working of the model, let the labor-intensive manufacture, X, be the 
numéraire good and set pX = 1.  Consider the example of an increase in the price of upland 
agriculture, pU.  As shown in panel (b) of Figure 2, this displaces the demand for upland labor 
vertically upwards by the amount of the price rise, and aggregate agricultural labor demand 
curve is increased by the price change times the upland share of agricultural labor.  With no 
change in manufacturing prices, labor is withdrawn from manufacturing and moves into 
agriculture; within agriculture, it is reallocated from lowland to upland production.   
 As a result of the price change, production in upland agriculture rises and that in lowland 
falls.  For the lowland, where the quantity of land is fixed, the output change is proportional to 
the reduction in labor use at the new, higher wage.  For the upland, we suppose that new land 
may be brought into production; however, as long as the labor required for forest conversion is 
directly proportional to that required for upland production, the change is still proportional to the 
corresponding labor demand shift.  Returns to land in each agricultural region are altered, as seen 
in panel (a); that in upland must rise, and that in lowland fall.  
 At the original wage and price levels, the withdrawal of labor from M has predictable 
resource allocation effects.  The aggregate labor-capital ratio in manufacturing falls (in terms of 
Figure 1, the line ′ becomes steeper) and the labor-intensive sector contracts, while H expands.  
This is not an equilibrium, however, as the increase in upland labor demand also exerts upward 
pressure on the wage.  With constant output prices, the productivity of labor in M must rise to 
match the wage increase.  As a consequence of the wage increase the M sector’s aggregate labor 
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demand falls and the LM curve in panel (b) moves to the right.  The final labor market 
equilibrium, depending on the extent to which the M industries in aggregate release labor, will be 
an economy-wide labor allocation lying between L1 and L2, with a wage between w0 and w1.  In 
manufacturing, both the quantity and price effects of the economy-wide labor market adjustment 
reduce the output of the labor-intensive sector; the output of the capital-intensive sector may rise 
or fall.  The return on M sector capital must also fall.    
 The environmental effects of the agricultural price increase can be inferred from the 
diagram.  In manufacturing, dirty output has expanded relative to clean, so the overall emissions-
intensity of manufacturing has risen.  Whether total emissions rise or fall depends on whether or 
not the dirty sector has expanded in absolute terms.  The price rise for upland raises the return to 
labor used in clearing forest along with that of labor used in production.  Looking across the 
economy as a whole, the price rise is an environmental lose-lose outcome (more deforestation, 
more emissions) if H expands, or a lose-win outcome if H contracts.  
The geometric exposition again highlights the observation that when there is more than 
one source of environmental damage, and when these are associated with activities in distinct 
sectors of the economy, the net effects of a policy or price shock may differ from its direct 
sectoral effect. It may confer an environmental benefit in the directly affected sector, but may 
indirectly confer a benefit or a loss in another sector. This point is not captured in models where 
‘environmental damage’ refers to a single phenomenon such as forest loss or industrial pollution.  
Effects of domestic agricultural trade reforms 
Many developing countries are net food importers and protect domestic food sectors.  WTO 
agreements, among other influences, have led many, such as China, India, Indonesia and Sri 
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Lanka to relax agricultural protection over the past decade. What are the environmental 
consequences of such reforms? 
We can adopt the previous approach, with minor modifications, to analyze this case. For 
greater policy relevance, in this exercise, we also relax Assumption 2, that food is produced only 
in the lowland, and  suppose that both regions grow food crops that are substitutes (e.g., rice and 
corn), and that production is sold in competition with imports in a tariff-protected domestic 
market.  This better fits the stylized facts of food-importing countries (see next section).   
Redefining the domestic price vector so p = (pF + t F , pU + tU , pH + t H ,1) , the aggregate 
budget constraint is rewritten as E = I + t′Z, where t′Z is the inner product of the tariff vector 
and the vector of excess demands for F, U and H.  From (4) and (5), the labor market impacts of 
tariff reforms in agriculture follow by substitution of tariff changes for price changes.  The 
aggregate budget constraint, ignoring variables held constant at their initial values, is:  
  
 
E(t,J,T,!) = Q(LF ,t F ) + R(LU ,T,tU ) + S(LM ,t H ) + t'Zj             (20) 
for j ∈(F,U,H).  Then the effects of changes in tF and/or tU are again found by total 
differentiation. The results differ from terms-of-trade shocks by the absence of first-order 
welfare effects and presence of second-order terms capturing tariff distortions and the extent to 
which output in each sector responds to a labor endowment change.   
 
Proposition 4 (Agricultural trade liberalization):  In food-importing countries, lowering 
protection on food crops reduces industrial pollution, and may also reduce deforestation.   
 
Taking the total differential with respect to the agricultural tariffs gives: 
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E
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(1" t'Ej! )d! + EJdJ + ETdT = t'Z jjdt
j
+ (t
H
SLL " t
F
QLF )dL
F
+ (t
H
SLL " t
U
RLU )dL
U
   (21) 
In this expression, the first term on the r.h.s. is the standard real income loss due to an increase in 
a tariff, and is negative (positive) for dtj > (<) 0.  The other two terms within parentheses are 
both non-positive, so the overall sign depends on changes in LF and LU.  Solving for changes in 
labor demand due to tariff reductions, analogously to the procedure shown in (7) to (10), gives 
 
dL
F
dt
F
< 0, dL
U
dt
F
> 0, dL
M
dt
F
> 0,  and 
 
dL
F
dt
U
> 0, 
 
dL
U
dt
U
< 0, dL
M
dt
U
> 0 .  Hence the 
prediction of aggregate real income change (with EJ = ET = 0) is indeterminate.  By the same 
logic used earlier, the environmental consequences are 
 
dT dt
F
> 0, dJ dt
F
< 0  for a reduction in 
tF, and 
 
dT dt
U
< 0, dJ dt
F
< 0  for a reduction in tU.  Lowering the tariff on the lowland food crop 
increases deforestation but reduces industrial pollution, while lowering that on the upland food 
crop reduces both.  If the two occur together, industrial pollution will unambiguously diminish, 
but the deforestation rate may rise or fall.  The following table summarizes these results.  
 
 Tariff change 
 dtF < 0 dtU < 0 Both 
dLF < 0 > 0 ? 
dLU > 0 < 0 ? 
dLM > 0 > 0 > 0 
dJ < 0 < 0 < 0 
dT > 0 < 0 ? 
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Tariff reduction in upland agriculture yields conventional real income gains, and reduces both 
forms of environmental damage—a win-win outcome.  Lowland agricultural tariff reduction may 
increase deforestation but is otherwise economically and environmentally desirable.12  
Strengthening upland property rights  
The open access nature of property rights in the forest sector leads to overexploitation of forests, 
and establishing well-defined property rights is an important element of the institutional reform 
agenda in developing countries.  Though space limitations preclude presenting the formal 
analysis, the economic reasoning is clear.  Recall from the discussion of Figure 1 that because 
there is open access to forests for conversion to upland land, the privately optimal labor 
allocation in upland agriculture equates average, rather than marginal costs and returns.  Thus the 
curve LA in panel (b) of the figure is equal to the horizontal sum of labor’s value marginal 
product in lowland agriculture and its average product in upland.  It follows that enforcing 
property rights in forests, which reduces the rents earned from land-clearing, displaces the LA 
curve to the left—in the limiting case, when property rights in forest are fully enforced, to the 
point at which it is simply the sum of the upland and lowland marginal (i.e. labor demand) 
curves.  In panel (c), increased labor availability to lowlands and lower economy-wide wage will 
once more reduce the overall emissions-intensity of manufacturing production. Thus the 
establishment of property rights in forestland will tend to reduce both deforestation and urban 
pollution in this case, even though forestlands will continue to remain undervalued as long as 
their full environmental benefits are not reflected in their land values. 
4.  Economic structure and environment: some stylized Asian economies 
 
The core model outlined in section 2 is capable of a number of permutations, each reflecting a 
different economic structure and set of policies.  It can be easily adapted, for example, to model a 
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range of cases in developing Asia, where countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam provide a laboratory of sorts for the comparative study of the 
interaction of growth, trade, policy reforms, and environment.  Despite many similarities, they 
differ in terms of some key aspects of economic structure (Table 3).  Some, for example, are 
important food exporters (Thailand and Vietnam) while others are net importers and typically 
protect their food sectors (Philippines, Indonesia).  All, however, face common problems in 
terms of rising industrial pollution, deforestation and other forms of natural resource degradation.   
 Until the 1990s most countries maintained high protection for import competing capital-
intensive manufactures, with outcomes strongly consistent with the discussion above. Protection 
raised profitability of capital intensive manufactures, discouraged labor-intensive exports, and 
made the manufacturing sector as a whole more emissions-intensive.  Because the tariff lowered 
returns to labor in manufacturing, labor moved into agriculture, reduced the cost of land-clearing 
for upland agriculture, and increased deforestation.  This has been a common story throughout 
tropical Asia. But contrasting outcomes emerge when the effects of agricultural trade policies are 
examined.  
In the Philippines, a net food importer, food is cultivated in both lowlands and uplands, 
with rice in the lowlands and corn in the uplands. Its policy of food sector protection draws labor 
out of manufacturing, and as the model showed, the labor-intensive, export-oriented 
manufacturing industry experiences the largest relative output decline.  Both upland and lowland 
agriculture expand.  Lowland, however, is constrained by a fixed land endowment; in uplands, 
the higher food price increases the return to forest clearing to create new lands.  Thus the 
protection for food producers increases deforestation and reduces the output of labor-intensive 
manufactures.  The emissions-intensity of manufactures rises, but overall industrial pollution 
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may rise or fall since the sector as a whole will contract.  The combination of industrial 
protection and agricultural protection in this type of economy thus favors both emissions-
intensive industrial development and deforestation at the upland agricultural margin. By the 
same token, liberalization of both agricultural and manufacturing trade is likely to have positive 
income and environmental effects.13 
In contrast, Indonesia’s upland agriculture produces primarily industrial crops for export.  
Protection for lowland agriculture (food), in this economy, causes the lowland region to expand, 
raising labor demand; this promotes down-slope migration and discourages deforestation at the 
upland frontier.  As before, the protection for food producers also draws labor out of the 
manufacturing sector, reducing the relative size of the clean exportable goods sector and 
increasing emissions-intensity.  By comparison with the first example, in this case food sector 
protectionism tends to diminish pressures on forests. Hence, in Indonesia’s case, the real income 
gains that will accrue from liberalization of food imports has to be balanced against increased 
deforestation. Thailand and Vietnam, whose lowland agriculture produce an export crop (rice) 
present yet another variant, with different income and environmental outcomes associated with 
trade policy reforms and exogenous price movements. Global reductions in food prices, for 
example, may well cause increased deforestation as labor moves out of lowland agriculture, in 
addition to the negative income effects associated with terms of trade declines.   
 These brief sketches indicate ways in which apparently minor variations in economic 
structure can be associated with significantly different income and environmental outcomes in 
response to similar policy shocks or exogenous changes. If nothing else, they do indicate clearly 
that even within a relatively similar subset of developing economies, there are no grounds for 
supposing the existence of a common set of environmental and natural resource depletion trends 
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in the course of economic growth.  Further, generalizations about the income and environmental 
outcomes of domestic or international policy reforms for developing countries may be quite 
misleading. 
5.  Conclusions 
 
Debate on the environmental effects of trade liberalization in developing countries remains 
intense, but available models often miss significant structural features critical to policy relevant 
analysis. Our analysis in this paper highlights, first, the need to recognize that it may be 
misleading to focus on only some types of environmental damage when considering the overall 
impact on environmental degradation.  Different types of environmental damage—in our 
example, industrial emissions and deforestation—respond in different ways to economic shocks, 
requiring calculation of the relative economic value of different types of environmental resources 
and the net economic value of the overall environmental effects. Second, the actual 
environmental outcomes of specific exogenous shocks or policies depend critically on the initial 
structure of the economy.  The same shock could well have opposed environmental effects in 
two developing economies that appear very similar in many respects.  This finding undermines 
the generality of findings on the trade-environment relationship that rely on more abstract 
characterizations of economic structure.  Third, in yet another illustration of the theory of second 
best, when environmental externalities coexist with policy-induced distortions, partial policy 
liberalization may have negative effects on aggregate welfare or on environmental problems.  
However, from a policy standpoint, it should be stressed that the widespread opposition to trade 
liberalization among many environmentalists may be misplaced: because most developing 
countries have intrinsic comparative advantage in labor intensive products, liberalization of 
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manufacturing imports is likely to improve both (conventionally measured) real incomes and 
environmental quality in many developing countries.  
 None of these findings are novel to trade theorists, but they have yet to emerge as clearly 
understood facets of economy-environment relationships in developing economies.  These 
analytical results can also play an important role in highlighting the limitations of reliance on 
oversimplified or over-general models in the trade-environment literature.   
 The model we have presented can be extended to address other important issues, such as 
the impact of international capital flows into developing economies.  It can also more explicitly 
incorporate various types of intersectoral production externalities and issues related to internal 
market segmentation in factor and goods markets.14  In addition, the model provides guidance for 
construction of more richly specified applied general equilibrium analyses of the environmental 
outcomes of policy and global market shocks.  It should be emphasized, however, that trade 
policies cannot substitute for targeted environmental policies, partly (but not only) because scale 
effects of growth are likely to dwarf composition effects in the longer run.  On the other hand, 
that it is equally important to recognize that domestic and global trade policy liberalization is not 
always anti-environment. Indeed, in a number of developing countries, trade liberalization may 
not only confer conventional income gains, but be pro-environment as well. 
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Table 1: Estimated changes in natural forest and plantation cover  
 
 
Region 
 
1990 (‘000 ha) 
 
2000 (‘000 ha) 
Average annual change 
of natural forest 
 Nat. forest Plantation Nat. forest Plantation ‘000 ha Per cent 
Africa 697,882 4,415 641,828 8,038 -5,589 -0.8 
Oceania 36,201 149 34,869 263 -133 -0.4 
S. America 903,199 7,279 863,739 10,455 -3,946 -0.4 
Asia 495,340 56,117 431,422 115,873 -6,392 -1.3 
—Tropical  289,820 22,486 233,448 54,624 -5,637 -1.9 
—Temperate 205,520 33,631 197,974 61,249 -755 -0.4 
Source: World Resources Institute calculations from FAO data (Matthews 2001).  
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Table 2: Capital-intensity and pollution intensity in Thailand 
 
  
 
Weighted Average  
Import-
competing  
 
 
Exporting  
 
Effective rate of protection (ERP)  139.39  -12.01 
   
Labor-intensity (labor cost as a  
fraction of total cost)  
0.42  
 
0.61 
 
Acute Human Toxicity Index  6.47  
 
2.92 
 
Sources:  Coxhead (2003 )  
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Table 3: GDP growth rates and shares (%) of major sectors, selected Asian countries 
 
Country GDP growtha Years Agric. Industry (Mfg) Services 
Indonesia 3.97 1960-80 42 23 10 35 
  1981-90 22 37 16 40 
  1991-00 18 43 24 40 
Malaysia 4.12 1960-80 29 30 14 41 
  1981-90 20 39 21 41 
  1991-00 13 42 27 45 
Philippines 1.04 1960-80 28 31 23 41 
  1981-90 24 36 25 40 
  1991-00 20 32 23 48 
Thailand 4.34 1960-80 29 25 17 46 
  1981-90 17 33 24 50 
  1991-00 11 39 29 50 
Vietnam 5.37b 1960-80 .. .. .. .. 
  1981-90 40 29 26 32 
  1991-00 29 30 20 41 
Sri Lanka 2.99 1960-80 30 24 17 47 
  1981-90 27 27 15 46 
  1991-00 23 26 16 50 
a.  Real per capita income (1995 US$), annual average 1970-2000.  b.  1991-2000.   
.. = not available.   Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators 2001
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Notes 
                                                
1 “One large omission from our review is any explicit discussion of renewable or non-
renewable use of resource use or sustainability... but an analysis of trade’s impact on 
resource use will take us too far afield”. (Copeland and Taylor, 2003:5). 
2  The model is a major revision of Coxhead and Jayasuriya (2003).  Some features, notably 
the modeling of forest clearing in upland, are drawn from Lopez and Niklitschek (1991).   
3  This assumption is easily changed to reverse comparative advantage in the two crops, and 
also to permit a single commodity to be produced in both areas but with different levels of 
land productivity. 
4 The spatial separation of upland and lowland can be exploited to yield richer model 
specifications that generate insights into impact of enhanced domestic market integration in 
previously segmented labor and goods markets. 
5 Our key point is that any reduction of virgin forest leads to environmental losses. We do not 
seek to address the widely analyzed case of the impact of higher timber prices on forests, 
where commercial forests are included as part of the total forest endowment. 
6  This can be easily relaxed; see Copeland and Taylor (1999).  Coxhead and Jayasuriya 
(2003) also explore intersectoral production externalities in a similar model.  
7 The positive externalities associated with trade liberalization are often highlighted in the 
literature. In principle, however, trade liberalization in capital/skill intensive manufacturing 
may also imply foregoing positive externalities associated with ‘learning by doing’ type 
effects.  
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8  This assumption is made for convenience only.  Coxhead and Jayasuriya (2003) model 
upland production with more than one output and different factor proportions.   
9  If there were non-traded final goods in the economy, there would be additional substitution 
terms in (6) due to endogenous price changes (Coxhead and Jayasuriya 2003).  
10 Nor are the costs of forest clearing limited to the national economy.  In Indonesia, 
widespread forest burning to establish oil palm and other plantations since the late 1990s has 
generated significant pollution in the form of smoke, or ‘haze’ in neighboring countries as 
well as through much of Indonesia itself.  
11 Output in each of the M sectors can also be computed from the diagram, by drawing lines 
tangential to each unit cost curve at the point of intersection and calculating sectoral 
employment shares of capital and labor along each axis.  See Mussa (1979).   
12 In countries with diversified upland sectors—producing both food and export crops—tariff 
reduction will have an unambiguously pro-forest effect, if plantation crops grown in uplands 
are less land-intensive and do not produce other forms of environmental damage (see 
Coxhead and Jayasuriya 2003).  
13 See Coxhead and Jayasuriya (2004) for a discussion of the Philippines case. 
14 Such extensions can draw on Copeland and Taylor (1999) who present a model in which 
industrial emissions degrade the natural resource base, and Bandara and Coxhead (1999) who 
analyze the effects of soil erosion on industrial production costs through impacts on hydro 
power production. 
